In the Table of Judgment Kant argues that although from the point of view of general logic infinite judgments are nothing but affirmative judgments, in a transcendental logic the two must be distinguished. In addition to explaining the logical difference between the two kinds of judgments, he hints at two reasons for why the distinction is important. First, he suggests that infinite judgment (as opposed to negative judgment) is related to error. Second, he remarks that the function involved in infinite judgment ”may perhaps be important in the field of its [the understanding’s] pure a priori cognition” (KrV A 72-73/B 97-98). In the talk it is argued that both of these promissory notes point to the Transcendental Dialectic. Here “infinite judgment” plays a crucial role since it allows Kant to make sense of how one can posit objects without increasing our knowledge about them. In other words, without the class of infinite judgment the limiting function of the concepts of reason cannot be accommodated.