XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Kant’s Conception of Pure Reason and the (Im)possibility of Rational Intuition

Marcus Willaschek

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Pacinotti
Data: 24 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010

Abstract

In the Introduction to Transcendental Dialectic, Kant defines pure reason as a discursive faculty. This rules out the possibility of rational intuition by definition, even though many proponents of the metaphysical tradition that Kant criticizes rely on rational intuition as a source of metaphysical knowledge. This raises the question whether Kant provides an argument against the possibility of rational intuition. Even though Kant does not give such an argument explicitly, he provides the materials for one. The central idea behind this argument is Kant’s assumption, implicit in many of his writings since 1772, that mental representation requires causal contact between the representation and the represented object.