In this paper I discuss the way in which the Critique of Practical Reason develops the implications of Kant’s “transcendental idealism.” What does it mean, in the horizon of the second Critique, that practical reason is “independent” of the conditions of space and time and yet is active in the world? I outline the general perspective in which Kant’s idea of practical reason and the corresponding, complex notion of practical sensibility should be placed. In the first part of the paper, with the help of the 1786 essay What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? I define the problem of practical reason as that of determining its “moral space” and its practical “orientation” within it. In the second part, I read the famous last page of the second Critique in light of the issue of practical orientation raised by the 1786 essay. I conclude with a remark concerning the transcendental perspective that qualifies the agent of Kant’s critical ethics as a “human” being.