XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Kant's Transcendental Strategy in the First Critique

Terence Hua Tai

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Pacinotti
Data: 24 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010

Abstract

Since the publication of his paper "Transcendental Arguments" in 1968, Barry Stroud has been criticizing what he takes to be a Kantian anti-skeptical strategy that attempts to infer from psychological premises about how we "think" or "experience" to some metaphysical conclusion about the world. Stroud finds such an inference from the psychological to the metaphysical questionable. In this paper I will argue that Stroud's criticism does not rest on a fair reading of Kant. I will suggest an account of how Kant is to construct the transcendental deduction of the categories, and show that Kant's premises are not "psychological" in the sense that makes it problematic to make the inference from the psychological to the metaphysical. If I am right, Stroud has yet to show that the "transcendental strategy" he considers defective has a Kantian root.