XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Vindicating Double Affection

Nick Stang

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: Conference Room
Data: 23 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010

Abstract

Some commentators have attributed to Kant the doctrine of double affection: subjects are causally affected both by things in themselves, and by appearances. Several commentators have claimed that this doctrine faces serious philosophical problems. I begin by explaining what I take to be the worst problem faced by the doctrine of double affection: appearances cannot cause the very representations in virtue of which they exist. I then explain Erich Adickes’s famous and influential explication of the doctrine of double affection, and explain how Adickes would solve the problem. I argue that Adickes’s solution is inadequate, and then I offer my own solution to the problem, and my own version of the doctrine of double affection.