Kant and the Map of Perceptions
Ivo da Rocha Oliveira
Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: Auditorium
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 12 aprile 2010
Sala: Auditorium
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 12 aprile 2010
Abstract
One of the aspects regarding Kant’s notion of philosophy is that philosophy distinguishes itself from all other forms of Knowledge exclusively as regards form. This particular aspect can be reinforced when one considers the Kantian comparison between the human soul and a map which is common to all types of knowledge. This paper will try to show that this precise comparison has its root in Leibniz’s key concept of “obscure representation” and that the map, the same for all types of Knowledge, is not the result of a compositum reale, as defended by Leibniz, but already presupposes the presence of transcendental structures, that is, its constitution can only be traced by philosophy.