XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

The Two Objects of Practical Reason. Moral autonomy, human causality, and inner disposition (Gesinnung)

Jose M. Torralba

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Fermi
Data: 26 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010

Abstract

The concept of the object of practical reason is key to the framework of Kant’s second Critique. Moral autonomy may only be justified if reason is capable of constituting of itself and a priori an object adequate to a morally determined will. Such an object is referred to as the good (das Gute). This paper comprises an argument in favour of the following two theses: (1) that there are two objects of practical reason (rather than only one), which defer to a dual order of subjective practical principles or maxims (Maxime and Gesinnung), and which depend on the two-fold level of the faculty of desire (judgment and will), as well as the two senses in which Kant uses the term “practical freedom”; and (2) that the concept of the object of practical reason may only be coherently understood in relation to Kant’s thought regarding the categories of freedom and the typic of the pure practical faculty of judgment.