XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Kant and Allison (and Kant) on Rational Agency as Free Agency

Kari Refsdal

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: Conference Room
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 15:30
Ultima modifica: 12 aprile 2010

Abstract

In my paper I give a short account of Kant’s distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, and identify one problem engendered by the close relationship that Kant seems to presuppose between morality and freedom – the problem concerning the freedom of not morally relevant actions. I then give an account of one possible solution to this problem, Henry Allison’s distinction between freedom as practical spontaneity and freedom as autonomy. While I admit that Allison’s solution is supported by textual evidence, I argue that, from a wider perspective, it conflicts with important aspects of Kant’s philosophy, and conclude that further work is required on Kant’s theory of rational agency as free agency.