XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

How Kant Explains the Delusion that Some Actions are Supererogatory

Brian Watkins

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Diderot
Data: 24 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010

Abstract

Kant's ethical theory has been charged with being blind to the 'simple fact' that some actions are good but not required. I agree that Kant makes no room for supererogatory actions in his account of moral experience, but I go on to argue that he has the resources to explain why some actions, nevertheless, commonly appear to fall into this class. I draw upon Kant's accounts of the sublime and respect for the moral law to show how feeling can affect moral reflection in a way that leads naturally to the delusion that some actions are good but not required.