XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Kant and Quine on the Two Dogmas of Empiricism

Bryan Hall

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Pacinotti
Data: 23 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010

Abstract

In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Quine begins his attack on the analytic/synthetic dogma by criticizing Kant’s conception of analyticity. After dismissing Kant’s interpretation among others, he articulates a view of the distinction that connects it to the other dogma of empiricism, reductionism. Ultimately, Quine rejects both dogmas in favor of a new form of empiricism which subscribes to neither one. Although I believe that Kant would also reject the reductionism dogma and for some of the same reasons as Quine, I argue that this opens the way to a new interpretation of the analytic/synthetic distinction that is immune from Quine’s criticisms of Kant.