XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Leibniz, Kant and the Doctrine of a Complete Concept

Ludmila Ludmilova Guenova

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala B
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010

Abstract

In the Dialectic of the first Critique, Kant employs the Leibnizian notion of a complete concept as the starting premise for his own argument as to why pure reason postulates a transcendental ideal. While a number of insightful studies have examined the relation between the principle of thoroughgoing determination and the idea of an ens realissimum, few have posed the question as to why Kant commits himself to the principle of thoroughgoing determination in the first place. In this paper I show just why Kant thinks it is necessary to strive towards the construction of a complete concept. I argue that the principle of thoroughgoing determination addresses a crucial problem that emerges out of Kant’s most basic views regarding the nature of empirical concepts: namely, the gap between the generality of our concepts and the particularity of the empirical manifold.