XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Arguing for Apperception

Patricia Williams Kitcher

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Fermi
Data: 23 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 08 maggio 2010

Abstract

I have two ambitious goals in this short paper. First I try to show that Kant does not assume the unity of apperception, but argues for it in both the A and B deductions. On this point, I disagree with Wolfgang Carl. Although I accept with much of Carl’s analysis of the A deduction, I think he errs in claiming that Kant provides no ground for apperception (1992, 178). I dispute this point by producing the argument. My second and briefer effort is to show that Kant’s argument for apperception establishes that self-knowledge has a more substantial epistemology than is assumed by contemporary ‘I’ theorists.