### Leibniz and Kant on Modalities

Massimo Mugnai

Sala: sala B

Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 17:00

Ultima modifica: 12 aprile 2010

#### Abstract

In this paper I first discuss Leibniz's claim that all kinds of truths ('truths of reason' and 'truths of fact', according to his taxonomy) are analytical, and compare it with Kant's distinction between analytical and synthetical truths. Then I present Leibniz's account of the modal concepts of possibility and necessity, contrasting it with Kant's main views about the same concepts. In particular, concerning Kant, I investigate his thesis that to deny a mathematical true judgement does not imply a contradiction in terminis – i.e. a contradiction in purely logical terms. This gives rise to a discussion of some aspects of Kant's theory of mathematics and, in particular of Kant's notion of a proof which may shed light on his peculiar ways of considering the modal concepts of possibility and necessity.