XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

The problem of systematic unity in Kant's two definitions of philosophy

Lea Leman Ypi

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: Auditorium
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 12 aprile 2010

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between the practical interest of reason and the theoretical demand for systematic unity as it emerges in the Critique of pure reason. It focuses in particular on the two definitions of philosophy that Kant discusses in the Architectonic of pure reason: the scholastic and the cosmic definitions. It argues that, in a way similar to the Critique of judgement, Kant here attempts to identify in the concept of teleology a bridge between the theoretical and the practical interests of reason. However, Kant’s inability to identify a separate “domain” for the exercise of the principles of practical reason in the first Critique complicates this task and leads Kant to defend physical-theology. This shows that contrary to what constructivist interpretations have traditionally maintained, Kant’s first Critique did not succeed in abandoning rationalist metaphysics. On the contrary he ended up offering one of its most subtle endorsements.